The economic geography of offshore incorporation in tax havens and offshore financial centres : the case of Chinese MNEs. by Buckley,  P. J. et al.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
15 October 2014
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Buckley, P. J. and Sutherland, D. and Voss, H. and El-Gohari, A. (2015) 'The economic geography of oﬀshore
incorporation in tax havens and oﬀshore ﬁnancial centres : the case of Chinese MNEs.', Journal of economic
geography., 15 (1). pp. 103-128.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbt040
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Journal of Economic
Geography following peer review. The version of record Peter J. Buckley, Dylan Sutherland, Hinrich Voss, and Ahmad
El-Gohari (2015) 'The economic geography of oﬀshore incorporation in tax havens and oﬀshore ﬁnancial centres : the
case of Chinese MNEs.' Journal of Economic Geography, 15(1), 103-128 is available online at:
http://joeg.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/12/12/jeg.lbt040.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
1 
 
The Economic Geography of Offshore Incorporation in Tax Havens and Offshore 
Financial Centres: The Case of Chinese MNEs 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
A large share of the outward foreign direct investment of emerging market MNEs is directed 
towards a small number of specific tax havens and offshore financial centres. The 
establishment of investment-holding companies for taxation related purposes is frequently 
adduced as a key motivation (“round-tripping”) for these investments. This explanation, 
however, accounts for neither the concentration of such investments in specific havens nor 
the comparatively large national shares of such investments that originate from emerging 
markets. Here we draw from and build links between the geography of money and finance 
and international business literatures to conceptually and empirically explore this prominent, 
if somewhat disregarded, feature of global FDI flows.  
 
 
Keywords: offshore financial centres, tax havens, theory of FDI, PR China 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
The growth of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) from emerging markets is an 
important force shaping international economic geography in the wake of the 2008 global 
financial crisis. This FDI growth has also stimulated interest in the characteristics, 
motivation, and behaviour of emerging market multinational enterprises (EM MNEs) (Deng, 
2012). This in turn has led to calls for new theoretical approaches to explain EM MNEs 
(Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Matthews, 2006; Luo and Tung, 2007; Hennart, 2012). Useful 
conceptualisations stress the relative (dis-)advantages EM MNEs experience and how their 
home country institutional environment influences their development (Luo and Rui, 2009; 
Luo, Zhao, Wang, and Xi, 2011). Despite this interest, comparatively little theoretical or 
empirical consideration has been given to the most prominent destination of emerging market 
OFDI, namely certain specific tax havens and offshore financial centres (THOFCs) and the 
role they play in the global economy (Palan, 2009; Wójcik, 2013). Here we cross-fertilize 
ideas found in financial geography with those in internalisation theory, a cornerstone theory 
of the MNE within the International Business (IB) literature, to develop our explanatory 
framework. Because classic internationalisation theory lacks a specifically spatial dimension, 
its integration with economic geography allows us to extend the theory. 
 
Brazil, Russia, India, and China, for example, all record very significant FDI to such 
destinations. By 2007, one half of Brazil’s OFDI stock was located in just three havens 
(Cuervo-Cazurra and Stahl, 2010) and by 2009, two thirds of Russia’s FDI stock was found 
in four havens (Kuznetsov, 2011). In 2008 and 2009, 40% of Indian OFDI flows went to two 
havens (RBI, 2010). By 2011, 74% of all mainland Chinese OFDI stock was registered in 
three tax havens (MOFCOM, NBS, and SAFE, 2012). By comparison the share of FDI stock 
for developed market economies in tax havens, despite their generally higher rates of 
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corporation tax, stood at around 25% to 33% (Hines, 2008; Palan, 2009). The high 
concentration of FDI by EM MNEs in a relatively small number of specific THOFCs requires 
further explanation. It is often suggested that tax-induced regulatory arbitrage (e.g., Fung, 
Yau and Zhang, 2010; Shaxson, 2011; Palan, 2009; Lipsey, 2007) is the main driver for such 
investments. Accordingly, it is argued that ‘most FDI into countries that serve as tax havens 
generate no actual productive activity’ (Beugelsdijk, Hennart, Slangen and Smeets, 2010, 1). 
The argument that THOFCs are ‘fictitious spaces’, however, does not explain the geographic 
concentration of such FDI in specific THOFCs, or why the average national OFDI shares to 
these jurisdictions are higher for many large emerging economies than for developed 
economies. In this paper we explore this problem conceptually and empirically for FDI from 
mainland China, drawing from and building links between the geography of money and 
finance (Martin, 1999; Wrigley, 1999; Pollard, 2003; Wójcik, 2013) and IB literatures, and 
more specifically, internalization theory (Buckley and Casson, 1976; McCann, 2011).  
 
The paper is organised into five further sections. Section 2 explains how internalization 
theory, a mainstay of IB, provides a complementary firm-level perspective to the insights and 
approaches of financial geography for understanding FDI to THOFCs. Section 3 outlines our 
data and research methods. Section 4 presents the findings and interprets these through the 
approaches introduced in Section 2. We conclude by outlining frameworks for explaining 
FDI to THOFCs derived from the cross-fertilization of internalization theory and financial 
geography. 
 
2. Financial geography and internalization theory 
Considerable shares of the world’s FDI stocks, as well as financial capital, are held in 
THOFCs. These jurisdictions, at least on paper, are therefore important host and source 
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countries for MNE activity. The high concentration of FDI to THOFCs (Sharman, 2012), 
particularly in the case of outward FDI from emerging markets, should make them of special 
interest to the IB research agenda, given its preoccupation with the MNE. This, however, has 
not been the case. Rather, economic geographers, and specifically financial geographers, 
have paid greater attention to financial centres (including THOFCs) (Hudson, 2000), albeit 
with a comparative lack of such research in the period leading up to the global financial crisis 
(Wójcik, 2013). We first explore the relevance of financial geography for understanding 
offshore incorporation in THOFCs before going on to explain how internalization theory 
provides a complementary approach for thinking about FDI to THOFCs.  
  
2.1. Financial geography, THOFCs and offshore incorporation 
Financial geography emerged from a recognition among economic geographers that financial 
systems and services are ‘lubricants’ that are of fundamental importance to ‘all production 
circuits’, and therefore ‘central to the operation of the economy’ (Dicken, 2011, 368). It also 
grew from an acknowledgement that the assumptions of the early researchers within the field 
of financial geography, which borrowed heavily from neoclassical growth theory, were not 
realistic (Martin, 1999). With its assumptions of ‘free and costless movement of capital and 
labour and perfect and ubiquitous information flows between regions, this theory essentially 
assumes away any regional role for money’ (Martin 1999, 3). In light of the global financial 
crisis and recognition that capital markets are often imperfect, however, ‘money and finance 
have now moved from the fringes towards the centre of interest in economic geography’ 
(Pryke, 2011, 298). This includes a growing recognition of the vital role of THOFCs (Wójcik, 
2013; Wainwright, 2011).  
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In emerging markets financial systems are considered to be quite inefficient and their capital 
markets, in this neoclassical sense, also imperfect. One might, therefore, expect finance to be 
highly relevant to the economic geography of emerging markets. The capital markets of the 
People’s Republic of China, for example, are generally considered not to be driven purely by 
market forces (and are imperfect, in this neoclassical sense) (Karreman and van der Knaap, 
2012; Lai, 2011; Vlcek, 2013). And as Martin (1999, 8) points out, ‘the institutional 
geography of the financial system is important because it can influence how money moves 
between locations and communities’. This is certainly true in China, where State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs), especially ‘national champion’ business groups, have privileged access 
to capital through the state banking sector at favourable rates and preferential access to 
capital markets owing to their embedded nature within the Communist Party system 
(Sutherland, 2009; Karreman and van der Knaap, 2012; Naughton, 2007). Private firms, by 
comparison, generally face acute challenges in securing bank loans because of state control 
over lending within Chinese banks and control over domestic stock markets (Shen, Shen, Zu, 
and Bai, 2009; Lai 2011). Consequently, except for the favoured few, private firms are often 
crowded out of the domestic capital market (Lu and Yao, 2009). As access to domestic 
capital is limited by regulation, discrimination by lenders and by the restricted range of 
outside funders, private firms search for alternative ways to augment their capital stock, 
sometimes outside of China.  
 
Accessing international capital markets, particularly through international listings, is an 
increasingly popular alternative for Chinese businesses (Wójcik and Burger, 2010). Capital 
market imperfections have also been identified in financial geography as an important driver 
of these EM MNE offshore listings (Clark and Wójcik, 2007; Wójcik and Burger, 2010). To 
date, however, this literature has been comparatively silent on the firm-level corporate 
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geography of FDI related to offshore incorporation in THOFCs that often precedes such 
listings. This is surprising, as the geography of money and finance has taken great interest in 
financial centres (Martin, 1999; Corbridge, Martin and Thrift, 1994; Leyshon and Thrift, 
1997; Hudson, 2000; Roberts, 1995; Mullings, 2004; Cobb, 1998). Pollard (2003), for 
example, emphasises that the study of specific financial centres is one of four major themes 
within this sub-discipline of economic geography (see also Martin (1999)). Until recently, 
however, the main focus within financial geography has been ‘on what might be termed the 
“geography of financial institutions, systems and markets”’ (Wrigley, 1999) and more 
generally ‘the “supply” architectures of financial geographies’ (Clark, Pollard and Leyshon, 
2009, 735). How firm-level financing has impacted on the spatial economy of firms, by 
contrast, has been somewhat overlooked (Wrigley, 1999; Lee et al., 2009; Pollard, 2003; 
Pryke, 2011). In one of the few studies of its kind, for example, Wrigley (1999) explored how 
firm-level financing decisions had significant impacts on the economic geography of US food 
retailers. From this study it was concluded that financial geographers had ‘traditionally 
underemphasised types of restructuring which involve transformations of the capital structure 
and ownership configuration of firms’, despite their important spatial consequences (Wrigley, 
1999, 186). Investments to THOFCs, as we will later show, often involve these kinds of 
transformations. 
 
This focus on the broader financial architecture and institutions, as opposed to firm-level 
financing and its impact on economic geography, also strongly manifests itself in the specific 
analysis of THOFCs by economic geographers (Cobb, 1998; Hudson, 2000; Roberts, 1994, 
1995). Economic geographers, for example, have analysed the role of THOFCs in fostering 
regulatory competition between states (Hudson, 2000; Mullings, 2004); the way in which 
THOFCs develop their own competitive advantages (Cobb, 1998); and how THOFCs shape 
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the global financial system (Roberts, 1994). The importance of THOFCs to the geography of 
the global financial system and architecture, including the growing volumes of offshore 
financial flows through THOFCs and their recent involvement in the global financial crisis, 
has been noted (French, Leyshon and Thrift, 2009).  
 
Interestingly, economists, in a somewhat similar fashion to economic geographers, have 
similarly taken a broadly macroeconomic approach to exploring THOFCs. This, for example, 
has involved undertaking modelling using national level data (Rose and Spiegel, 2007; 
Dharmapala and Hines, 2009). To date, therefore, the ways in which firm-level financing via 
THOFCs impacts on corporate economic geography has received comparatively less 
attention, both within economics and economic geography, with only a few exceptions 
(Wójcik, 2013; Wainwright, 2011). Yet, as noted, very large shares of global FDI flows are 
channelled through THOFCs. They therefore constitute an important component in the 
geographical map of global FDI stocks and flows and MNE activity, a subject of perennial 
interest to economic geographers (Dicken, 2003, 2011; Coe and Yeung, 2001; McCann, 
2011).  
 
In certain ways, the approach of IB scholars has mirrored the trends found in financial 
geography. In particular, the extent and ways in which firm-level financing decisions 
specifically influence the location decisions of MNEs have been somewhat overlooked. This 
omission is surprising, given it is well known that large volumes of FDI pass through 
THOFCs and that significant MNE activity is undertaken offshore, including the raising of 
capital and property rights transactions. This type of FDI, however, is often not considered to 
be involved in physically ‘productive activity’ (Beugelsdijk et al., 2010). It also does not 
easily fit under the categories of market, efficiency or asset seeking investment motivations, 
8 
 
or horizontal and vertical investments (Shatz and Venables, 2003), that the IB literature often 
focuses upon. As a result, it is often dismissed. One result has been the tendency to consider 
FDI to THOFCs as mainly driven by tax induced regulatory arbitrage (Fung et al, 2010) and 
not to treat it as genuine MNE activity. It has been noted, for example, that empirical studies 
looking at the location choice of MNEs simply often exclude such FDI (Beugelsdijk et al., 
2010). It is perhaps unsurprising then that Witt and Lewin (2007) have recently pointed out 
that all FDI seen purely as an ‘escape response’ to non-supportive home country institutional 
environments, including capital markets, remains a much neglected area in the IB research 
agenda.  
 
To summarise, there are some interesting and close similarities between the ways in which 
economic geographers, and specifically those with an interest in money and finance, and IB 
scholars, have elided from their analysis the impact of firm-level financing decisions on 
economic geography and investment location decisions. Partly as a result of this, conceptual 
and empirical firm-level analysis of why MNEs use specific THOFCs, what they do in them, 
and the implications of their use, is still rather limited. Internalization theory, with its specific 
focus at the micro-level, as well as its concern with imperfect markets, provides a 
complementary approach to those found in economic geography for further exploring 
offshore incorporation and FDI to THOFCs.  
 
2.2. Internalization theory and the economic geography of FDI to THOFCs  
Despite the interest of economic geographers in both financial centres and the role of capital 
market imperfections in determining economic geography, there remains a dearth of firm-
level analysis explaining offshore incorporation in THOFCs. Following from this, there are a 
number of reasons why the location choice of FDI as explained by internalization theory 
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(Buckley and Casson, 1976; McCann, 2011), provides a complementary approach to the 
financial geography literature looking at THOFCs. Firstly, internalization theory, which is 
based upon transaction cost economics and the theory of the firm, provides an explicit micro-
level perspective with which to analyse offshore incorporation and the related FDI to 
THOFCs. As noted, financial geography has paid less attention to how firm-level financing 
decisions impact upon firm-level corporate economic geographies. Rather, its interest has 
been directed more towards the geography of financial supply architectures and systems 
(Wrigley, 1999). Secondly, financial geography grew, in part, from the recognition that 
imperfect capital markets shape economic geographies. Internalization theory specifically 
deals with the role imperfect markets, including the impact of imperfect capital markets on 
FDI (Buckley and Casson, 2009), lending itself to cross-fertilization with financial 
geography. 
 
Thirdly, emerging markets, as noted, are renowned not only for their domestic capital market 
imperfections but also for their relatively poor domestic institutional environments and the 
high transactions costs that these can create (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). Emerging market 
businesses are often forced to undertake a wide variety of innovative responses in an attempt 
to mitigate these high transactions costs. A considerable literature, for example, explains the 
formation of ‘business groups’ as preferred organisational forms in emerging markets as one 
such response mechanism (Khanna and Yafeh (2007) summarise this extensive literature). 
The most successful THOFCs, by contrast, are recognized for their well-developed legal and 
financial systems, particularly those havens that also act as offshore financial centres (OFCs) 
(Dharmapala and Hines, 2009; Rose and Spiegel, 2007; Roberts, 1995). The drive for 
offshore incorporation and FDI flows may, therefore, be driven not only by domestic capital 
market imperfections and the needs of EM MNEs to augment their existing capital structure, 
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but also by access to a more favourable institutional environment. Internalization theory 
accounts for the impact of imperfect markets and also draws attention to these broader 
institutional misalignments, including how businesses exploit multi-country presence 
(Dicken, 2003). These may drive what has been referred to as ‘institutional arbitrage’ (Boisot 
and Meyer, 2008; Kedia and Mukherjee, 2009), in which EM MNEs use THOFCs to 
internalise institutional and market differences between countries, with the strategic intent of 
guaranteeing their long term economic viability. As such, firm-level financing and 
institutional arbitrage decisions may become an important determinant of where MNEs 
invest.  
 
Finally, we note that economic geographers have seen MNEs as geographical constellations 
of social relationships (Dicken, 2003; Yeung, 2009) that invest along horizontal and vertical 
axes (Shatz and Venables, 2003). In addition, they have at times decried what they see as the 
‘methodological nationalism’ of some IB scholars, in so far as they too closely follow the 
precepts of neoclassical economics (as exemplified by Yeung (2009, 204). Neoclassical 
economic theories and IB variants that build on them, for example, assume free and costless 
movement of capital and labour and perfect and ubiquitous information flows. It is argued 
these theories, including internalization theory, do not therefore explicitly address the role of 
territory in the case of financial flows and systems, or the spatially embedded nature of 
MNEs (Martin 1999; Yeung, 2009; Seo 2011). We look to address these criticisms here by 
arguing that localities and their specificities do matter, are location bound and are very 
difficult to transfer. As such, we regard the MNE as a locally embedded network of 
relationships, focussing here on financial relationships in particular. By doing so the paper 
progresses our understanding of the globalisation of EM MNEs and their corporate financial 
geographies (Coe and Yeung, 2001). It also advances the theory of the MNE by focussing on 
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the wider institutional framework of the global economy and relaxing the assumption that 
MNE’s ‘decision making and corporate behaviour are the same everywhere’ (Yeung 2009, 
203). Geography is therefore conceptualised as a central component of the existence of 
MNEs (Beugelsdijk, McCann and Mudambi, 2010).  
 
3. Research method, sample and analysis 
We look at the specific case of the People’s Republic of China to explore the use of THOFCs 
by EM MNEs in further detail, focusing in particular on the use of two of the more important 
THOFCs used by Chinese MNEs, the Cayman Islands and BVI, as well as their interaction 
with Hong Kong. China is a particularly interesting case because of the domestic institutional 
configuration and its evolution over time. Since 2000, mainland China’s outward OFDI has 
grown at a faster rate than at any time in its history. This is the result of domestic policy 
liberalisation and state promotion (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss, and Zheng, 2007; Luo, 
Xue, and Han, 2010). The majority of Chinese OFDI, however, is destined for several 
specific THOFCs (see Table 1). These constituencies accounted for 69-87% of the annual 
outflow between 2003 and 2011 so that, as noted, the stock of Chinese investments in these 
locations now stands at around 80% of the total. In 2006, one tax haven alone, the Cayman 
Islands, had become the largest recipient of Chinese OFDI, with 44% of officially recognised 
flows (and 18% of its global OFDI stock). Subsequently, the THOFC Hong Kong became the 
lead recipient ahead of the Cayman Islands and British Virgin Islands (BVI) (MOFCOM, 
NBS, and SAFE, 2012). In addition, by 2006, 18% of China’s utilised inward FDI originated 
from the BVI. Indirect financial flows to the Cayman Islands and BVI, moreover, are often 
channelled via Hong Kong (another OFC and haven) and arguably remain very large. As 
such, the triad of the Cayman Islands, BVI and Hong Kong remain very important to 
understanding the characteristics, motivations, and behaviour of Chinese MNEs (Vlcek, 
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2013). Or, as Kolstad and Wiig (2012, 33) note, the ‘question of how to account for 
investment ﬂows through tax havens is important for a more complete understanding of 
Chinese FDI’. 
 
***** TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ***** 
 
3.1. Sample selection 
As noted, economists have employed aggregated OFDI data to explore the impacts of 
THOFCs on regional capital markets (Rose and Spiegel, 2007). Economic geographers have 
also used specific haven examples to explain ‘bottom up’ accounts of tax haven development 
(Roberts, 1994; Corkill-Cobb, 1998; Hudson, 2000). Comparatively little research, owing to 
the inherent secrecy of havens, has been undertaken at the micro (firm)-level. This veil of 
secrecy makes it difficult to determine which firms have interests in THOFCs and what 
activities they engage in once offshore. One of the few windows through which to observe 
such behaviour is the publicly available data of firms that have raised capital on foreign stock 
markets. All businesses listed on stock markets in the United States, for example, must 
submit various formal documents to the United States Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC), including annual financial statements and reports. It is a requirement of the SEC that 
foreign private issuers complete a 20-F form annually (SEC, 2010). These submissions, 
owing to legal obligations, are generally candid in nature and provide detailed information on 
company accounts; capital raising activities and use of proceeds from such activities; 
information on the organizational structure; subsidiary information including the country in 
which any listing vehicle is incorporated and the use of offshore vehicles for such purposes. 
As such, the usage of 20-F forms is now well established in corporate governance and 
accounting research (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2002). 
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Our sample of firms is taken from all firms listed on the United States SEC EDGAR database 
classified as having their country location (i.e., primary business activities) in China (totalling 
869 firms as of June 2010). The vast majority of Chinese firms listed in the United States are 
incorporated offshore. From these we then identify and select firms meeting the following 
criteria: all firms submitting 20-F forms in the period January 2009 through to June 2010, to 
ensure the sample included only operational firms; all firms incorporated in OECD 
recognised tax havens (excluding blank check companies, i.e., a development stage company 
that has no operating activities or specific business plan); and all firms originating in China as 
wholly Chinese owned entities. This left a final sample of 72 firms (Table 2)
1
. 
 
The data for each firm within our sample covers the time period from each firm’s first 20-F 
submission until its latest submission, either in 2009 or 2010. Qiao Xing Universal Telephone 
was the first firm within our sample to submit a 20-F form to the SEC in 1999. Accordingly 
we analyse each of its twelve 20-F form submissions and its two 20-F form amendment 
submissions which cover the time period 1999-2010. There are 13 firms within our sample 
which listed in the 2009-2010 period and have submitted only one 20-F form to date, e.g. 7 
Days Group Holdings. Our analysis is therefore informed by its single submission. Section 4 
(‘company history’) of each 20-F form, however, includes information on the origins of the 
firm within China and details of its incorporation process within the tax havens. The 
information provided covers the time period from the incorporation of the firm offshore until 
the present. 
 
***** TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ***** 
                                                 
1
 A detailed overview of our sample is available from the authors. 
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All of the firms we analyse, by definition, have raised foreign capital in the USA. This may 
limit the conclusions that we can draw, as we cannot compare our findings to firms that have 
used offshore vehicles to trade on non-American markets, or have invested in the havens to 
raise capital through venture capitalists or other means. This said, given the legal obligations 
to accurately report information in SEC submissions, the use of 20-F forms partially 
overcomes issues of reliability and credibility from which primary data often suffer.  
 
3.2. Data analysis 
Following from our approaches outlined in section 2, we are concerned in the internalization 
of arbitrage opportunities related to capital market imperfections and other institutional 
constraints and whether these activities take place within particular THOFC jurisdictions as 
well as the reasons why Chinese MNEs might use specific THOFCs. We are therefore 
interested in which offshore jurisdictions Chinese firms use to (1) access capital and (2) to 
avail of a favourable institutional environment, including the legal institutional and regulatory 
environment conducive to doing business, as well as how they exploit this environment using 
multinational advanced business service (ABS) providers, including financial (i.e. investment 
banks) and professional service MNEs (i.e. legal and accounting firms). Our intention is 
therefore to explore some of the reasons, moving beyond taxation related reasons alone, for 
the use of THOFCs.  
 
We note the jurisdiction of the listing vehicles and the amount that is raised in each 
company’s initial public offerings (IPOs), also taking into account follow-on offerings and 
changes in bank borrowing following the IPOs, as proxies for capital raising activity in 
specific jurisdictions due to capital market imperfections in China. The jurisdiction of 
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incorporation and magnitude of the capital raised in the IPO (to give a sense of the 
importance of this activity) is calculated from information within the 20-F’s section 4 
(‘company history’); section 5 (‘investing activities’ and ‘financing activities’); and section 
14 (‘material modifications to the rights of security holders and use of proceeds’). To gain 
insights into the influence of high transaction cost activities and the specific THOFCs used 
for reducing these (Naughton, 2007) we explore whether the firm has used the offshore 
market for property rights to acquire other China based businesses that are held through 
offshore special purpose vehicles. Specifically, for each firm we check whether it has 
acquired controlling interests in any other Chinese company (either privately held or publicly 
listed) that itself is controlled through an offshore vehicle as well as the preferred THOFC of 
jurisdiction for this activity. We take this as a useful proxy for the use of offshore institutions 
and the favoured jurisdictions, as it explicitly reflects how Chinese businesses restructure 
their operations back in China through offshore vehicles. It therefore provides one further 
indicator of how offshore institutions are used for their benefit. Sections 3, 4 and 7 of the 20-
F form, covering ‘key information’; ‘company history’; and ‘related party transactions’, 
respectively, were used to identify such activities. For each firm we used all available 20-F 
submissions.  
 
Our final area of investigation relates to the nature of China’s OFDI to THOFCs vis-a-vis the 
domestic institutional environment as it changes over time. The new Enterprise Income Tax 
Law, introduced in mainland China in January 2008, has important implications for the use of 
offshore holding companies. It has harmonised corporate tax rates for foreign (i.e. including 
Chinese business owned via offshore holding-companies, as in our sample firms) and 
domestic businesses, as well as introducing new punitive withholding taxes for offshore 
companies. These tax changes potentially reduce the tax benefits of incorporating offshore. 
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The new law, however, also provides that some foreign investors (i.e. including offshore 
holding-companies that own domestic mainland subsidiaries) may benefit from specific inter-
governmental agreements on taxation (Buckley et al., 2008). Firms that are incorporated in a 
country or region with which China has a tax treaty may benefit from reduced rates of 
withholding taxes levied on dividends paid to offshore holding companies. Hong Kong has 
negotiated a highly favourable treaty (discussed later in section 4.3). The deployment of a 
Hong Kong based holding company directly holding mainland China subsidiaries, therefore, 
is used here as a proxy for responsiveness to institutional change. Sections 3 and 4 of the 20-
F form covering ‘risk factors’ and ‘organisational structure’, respectively, were used to 
establish how institutional changes influence investment decisions and the type of holding 
company structures used to mitigate these effects. 
 
We use three examples to illustrate our findings, supported by aggregate data from the 
sample. The selections were made on the basis that each case was representative of our 
sample firms (Yin, 2008). The examples provide richer detail (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989) of the 
activities undertaken by Chinese firms within THOFCs, and particularly for the three most 
commonly used havens of the Cayman Islands, BVI and Hong Kong.  
 
A limitation of our method is that it uses a sample of publicly listed businesses from one 
emerging market (mainland China) listed on US markets to gain insights into offshore 
incorporation. Further research could look at publicly listed Chinese companies on non-
domestic stock markets, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, with primary business activities 
in China. It could also explore whether our arguments hold for other EM MNEs. Our 
preliminary investigations, however, suggest that Chinese MNEs are not singular in 
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exploiting the access to capital markets and superior institutional environments of specific 
THOFCs.  
 
4. Findings and Discussion 
Financial geographers have identified the important role of imperfect capital markets and 
firm-level financing decisions in driving the spatial decision making of firms (Martin, 1999; 
Pollard, 2003; Wrigley, 1999). As with the IB literature, however, there is still limited firm-
level research on FDI to THOFCs, albeit that such jurisdictions are gaining increasing 
recognition in economic geography (Wójcik, 2013; Wainwright, 2011). Addressing this gap, 
our findings show that one way in which Chinese businesses address domestic market 
imperfections that have been created and sustained by government policies and regulations, 
such as the markets for capital and property rights, is by establishing offshore companies. As 
a result, they are able to reduce the costs of raising capital, restructuring their domestic 
businesses, and can pursue short-term and long-term strategic goals via the use of offshore 
vehicles. The transaction cost approach of internalization theory argues that FDI is 
determined by the internalization of imperfect markets across different locations, enabling 
MNEs to control crucial intermediate markets in goods, factors and services (Buckley and 
Casson, 1976). It also provides a useful explanatory framework for understanding why such 
high levels of FDI are found in certain specific THOFCs, which we now discuss.  
 
4.1 Capital market imperfections: the use of THOFCs for international listings  
According to internalization theory, outward investors seek locations that minimise the cost 
of their activities so as to achieve optimality in location for the firm. Buckley et al. (2007) 
applied this theory to Chinese OFDI and found that special determinants arising from 
imperfections in China’s capital market were a major factor in Chinese FDI. The capital 
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market in China, in the aforementioned neoclassical sense, is imperfect (Huang, 2003; 
Karreman and van der Knaap, 2012) and this in turn influences OFDI. A limited number of 
studies have also noted the importance of raising capital on foreign capital markets (Wójcik 
and Burger, 2010; Xiao, 2004). Xiao, for example, has noted that OFDI to tax havens and 
OFCs ‘creates value added much like the financial sector’s role for the real economy’ (Xiao, 
2004, 12). Xiao’s argument is not well developed, though the implication is clear: registering 
as a company in a tax haven could enable Chinese companies to circumvent imperfections in 
the domestic Chinese capital market. This may create greater value than they could obtain by 
listing on domestic stock exchanges, if such an option were even available.
2
 In the Chinese 
case, as access to domestic capital is limited by regulation, discrimination by lenders and by 
the restricted range of outside funders, private firms in particular must search for alternative 
ways to augment their capital stock, sometimes seeking capital outside of China. Financial 
geographers have also emphasised that the institutional geography of the financial system 
influences the movement of money between locations and different communities or groups 
(Martin, 1999). Investment in THOFCs via the creation of offshore holding companies is one 
such way of augmenting existing capital, particularly for private businesses. Of our sample of 
72 firms, in total 66 were incorporated in the Cayman Islands (55), BVI (7) and Hong Kong 
(4), with the remaining six in other havens. It is of interest to note, therefore, that by far the 
most commonly used offshore listing vehicles also correspond to some of the main 
destinations of officially recorded Chinese OFDI (Table 1). For these firms, details of the 
largest five shareholders are provided in their 20-F forms. The majority are usually owned 
and controlled by their founders (either directly, or beneficially through further BVI 
companies). Many are prominent Chinese entrepreneurs. In our 72 sample firms we identify 
42 in which the combined holdings of the three largest individual shareholders exceed 20% of 
                                                 
2
 The Chinese government prevents companies (even some large SOEs) from listing on Chinese stock markets – 
thereby forcing them to go overseas for financing (Kung and Cheng, 2012). 
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their companies’ ordinary shares, a threshold commonly considered sufficient to lock in 
control (La Porta et al., 2002). These individuals are identified as ‘founders’ in the 20-F 
submissions and are Chinese nationals. Nearly all of the other sample firms, moreover, have 
significant stakes owned by Chinese nationals, though sometimes these ownership shares 
have been diluted by other investors. Chinese OFDI to THOFCs can therefore be seen as a 
strong response to Chinese domestic capital market imperfections, particularly by private 
entrepreneurs.  
 
Collectively, the 72 sample firms raised estimated gross IPO proceeds of US$11bn and net 
proceeds of US$9.8bn.
3
 Major international investment banks, which all have significant 
operations in Hong Kong, acted as underwriters and co-ordinated the global offerings of our 
sample companies. This included CLSA, UBS, Credit Suisse First Boston, Morgan Stanley, 
JP Morgan, and ABN AMRO Rothschild. It is striking that 55 sample firms were 
incorporated in one haven, the Cayman Islands.
4
 Of these, moreover, 40 had one or more BVI 
holding companies owned by the Cayman Island listing vehicle, which usually in turn held 
the mainland subsidiaries. The sample firms commonly followed similar procedures of 
incorporation prior to listing, with 23 of the sample firms first registering in the BVI prior to 
incorporating their listing vehicle in the Cayman Islands.  
 
Suntech Power provides us with a representative example of the listing process, illustrating 
the sequence whereby Chinese businesses develop their offshore corporate structures. 
Suntech was originally incorporated in Wuxi (Jiangsu province), China as Suntech China. It 
                                                 
3
 This estimation is based on the average difference between gross and net IPO proceeds directed towards 
underwriting fees, advisory fees and related costs from firms returning both figures, applied to omitted IPO 
values from firms only returning either gross or net IPO proceeds in their 20-F statements.  
4
 Hong Kong symbolises well how advanced business services located here link the city with other important 
cities (in PRC: Shanghai), other offshore jurisdiction (CI, BVI) and the final country of business activity (China 
or elsewhere) (cf. Wójcik, 2013).  
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designs, develops and manufactures a variety of photovoltaic cells and modules and is one of 
the world’s largest producers. The following quote, taken from Section 4 of its 20-F form 
submitted in 2006 illustrates the process whereby offshore vehicles are used to raise capital 
and uses language that is echoed by a majority of sample firms in their 20-F forms:  
 
Suntech China was incorporated in January 2001 and commenced business operations in May 
2002. To enable us to raise equity capital from investors outside of China, we established a 
holding company structure by incorporating Power Solar System Co., Ltd., or Suntech BVI, in 
the British Virgin Islands on January 11, 2005. Suntech BVI acquired all of the equity interests 
in Suntech China through a series of transactions that have been accounted for as a 
recapitalization. In anticipation of our initial public offering, we incorporated Suntech Power 
Holdings Co., Ltd., or Suntech, in the Cayman Islands as a listing vehicle on August 8, 2005. 
Suntech became our ultimate holding company when it issued shares to the existing 
shareholders of Suntech BVI on August 29, 2005 in exchange for all of the shares that these 
shareholders held in Suntech BVI. We conduct a significant portion of our operations through 
Suntech China. (Suntech, 2006, 27)(emphasis added) 
 
***** FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ***** 
 
Suntech illustrates the typical processes and structures predominantly used by Chinese 
businesses when raising capital on foreign stock markets. Suntech raised net IPO proceeds of 
US$321.8mn on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 2005 (Suntech, 2010). CLSA 
Asia-Pacific Markets, based in Hong Kong, was an important underwriter of the IPO (which 
also included Credit Suisse First Boston and Morgan Stanley). Once in place, these offshore 
structures allow Chinese companies to raise further capital. In 2009, for example, Suntech 
closed a follow-on offering on the NYSE with net proceeds of US$277mn (Suntech, 2010). 
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Suntech has made use of two corporate bond offerings to raise capital in 2007 and 2008, with 
net proceeds of US$485.6mn and US$560.1mn, respectively. Following its IPO in 2005 
Suntech’s access to short term bank borrowing dramatically improved, its net proceeds from 
short term bank borrowing increased from US$15.3mn in 2005 to US$183.6mn in 2006 and 
to US$305.8mn by 2008 (Suntech, 2007, 2010). Suntech was able to realise net proceeds of 
US$294.1mn in longer term bank loans by 2009 (Suntech, 2010). Both Chinese and 
international banks lent to Suntech.  
 
The capital raised has allowed Suntech to expand its production capacity, exploit its China 
based low-cost manufacturing model and to allow it to undertake a series of acquisitions in 
industrialised countries. For example, in 2006 Suntech acquired MSK in Japan (now Suntech 
Japan; see Figure 1) – a leader in the integrated photo-voltaic market (Suntech 2006). In 
2008, Suntech acquired one of its component suppliers, KSL-Kuttler, a leading German 
based manufacturer of automation systems for the printed circuit board industry. In 2009 
Suntech acquired a 76.6% interest in CSG Solar, a German company involved in developing, 
producing and marketing PV cells (Figure 1).  
 
The strong preference to incorporate a listing vehicle in the Cayman Islands warrants further 
analysis. While zero rates of tax on income and capital gains and secrecy regulations are 
undoubtedly an attraction of the Cayman Islands, which can be exploited in numerous ways, 
such as via the use of complex transfer pricing and intra-corporate loan strategies, it is 
important to stress numerous other THOFCs would also meet these criteria (OECD, 2010). 
We believe the most important reason for Chinese firms to specifically favour the Cayman 
Islands as a base for their listing vehicles is that it allows them to minimise their costs of 
raising capital. The Cayman Islands is the world’s fifth largest financial centre by asset size 
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and an important adjunct to the North American capital markets (IMF, 2009; Roberts, 1995). 
The most recent comparisons show it had 464 offshore banks, compared with nine in the 
BVI, 30 in Cyprus and 77 in Guernsey (Hampton, 2002). As an OFC it also specialises in 
business related cross-border financial services, particularly in banking. It held total banking 
assets of US $1.7tr in 2009 (IMF, 2009). It has become jurisdiction to the largest number of 
investment funds in the world, with over 9,000 funds and net assets approaching US$2.3tr in 
2007 (IMF, 2009). The Cayman Islands also hosts 75% of the world’s hedge funds and nearly 
half of the estimated US$1.tr assets under management (HOC, n.d.). It therefore provides 
ready access to deep pools of international capital (IMF, 2009). Most importantly of all, 
however, by vertically locating a listing vehicle within the Cayman Islands, IPOs may also be 
undertaken on multiple stock exchanges, including both Hong Kong and US stock exchanges. 
Historically, no other havens have provided this facility (Greguras et al., 2008). Thus, the 
Cayman Islands is the jurisdiction of choice for listing vehicles and raising capital. As such, 
finance, accounting and legal professionals argue that ‘in many, if not most cases, the use of a 
Cayman vehicle is not wholly or mainly for tax planning purposes’ (Knowles, 2010, 1). This 
is not, of course, to say zero tax rates are unimportant, but simply that many other 
jurisdictions also offer such incentives. 
 
Financial geographers have drawn attention to the role of imperfect capital markets in 
shaping economic geography (Martin, 1999) even if to date research showing how corporate 
financing affects firm location decisions has been limited (Pollard, 2003; Wrigley, 1999; 
Pryke, 2011). As noted above, economic geographers have ‘traditionally underemphasised 
types of restructuring which involve transformations of the capital structure and ownership 
configuration of firms’ (Wrigley, 1999, 186). Similarly, IB research has largely overlooked 
the importance of imperfect capital markets and firm-level financing on location choice (Witt 
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and Lewin, 2007). The high concentration of EM MNE FDI in the Cayman Islands is a novel 
but important example of how firm-level financing decisions and responses to imperfect 
capital markets in the home country alter EM MNE corporate economic geography. The 
spatial consequences of the decisions that we have focused on here are related to 
incorporation in offshore jurisdictions. As Roberts (1994) puts it, in some senses these are 
‘fictitious spaces’, as the businesses in question usually do not physically relocate there and 
no physical production is undertaken offshore. Nonetheless, the use of these jurisdictions 
does have very significant impacts on the more tangible, value-adding productive activities of 
these MNEs, somewhat akin to vertical FDI. In this light, Pollard’s (2003, 446) comment that 
‘finance is a fundamental part of economic co-ordination that is not logically prior to or 
separate from production’, is highly germane (see also Sarre (2007) for an elaboration on the 
links between finance and production). It has been shown, for example, how the capital raised 
offshore facilitates both further domestic and international expansion of Chinese businesses 
(Sutherland and Ning, 2011), illustrating its direct links to production.  
 
4.2. Institutional misalignments: the offshore market for Chinese companies 
THOFCs may also provide institutional support for the restructuring of domestic operations 
back in China. Boisot and Meyer (2008) conceive of Chinese OFDI as a means of 
‘institutional arbitrage’, that is the strategic pursuit of an MNE to exploit differences in the 
configuration of the professional, administrative, cultural, economic, or geographic 
environment between countries to their own advantage (Dicken, 2003; Ghemawat, 2003; 
Gaur and Lu, 2007; Zhao, 2006). The market for property rights of other Chinese businesses, 
for example, was late in its development and the domestic transactions costs are reportedly 
high (Jefferson and Rawski, 2002; Naughton, 2007). OFDI to THOFCs simultaneously 
allows Chinese firms to reduce costs arising from various types of institutional 
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misalignments. Chinese firms, moreover, avail of administrative and professional institutions, 
and engage in a form of arbitrage whereby they exploit the other comparatively superior 
institutions of foreign markets. As noted, these superior offshore institutional environments 
are also exploited via the use of large multinational ABS providers which themselves 
typically have a significant offshore presence. For example, we found 23 of the 72 20-F 
submissions in our sample were directly audited via the Hong Kong registered affiliates of 
several large MNE accounting firms (with KPMG in the lead, followed by Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu and Price Waterhouse Coopers). A further 25 were audited by the local mainland 
subsidiaries of these MNEs (typically in Shanghai or Beijing). Our sample firms show that 
the use of established MNE business service providers, which typically have both a strong 
offshore and onshore presence, are used by our sample firms so as to fully exploit the benefits 
of offshore incorporation.  
 
It is notable that important transactions involving the buying and selling of Chinese 
businesses take place via these offshore jurisdictions. In our sample firms we find evidence 
that 22 firms have acquired fully or partially one or more other China based companies that 
are themselves held through offshore holding companies, supporting the idea that havens 
offer a supportive institutional environment for organisational restructuring. Chinese firms 
may also benefit from foreign banking and financial expertise, which can add value to the 
Chinese capital (Zhan, 1995), as well as more sophisticated and stable legal institutions 
(Huang, 2003). This allows businesses to undertake significant restructuring of their 
mainland operations via THOFCs and reduce their exposure to, and negotiation with, Chinese 
institutions in this process. As with the high transactions costs incurred in domestic capital 
markets, transactions costs in the domestic market for property rights may force businesses to 
seek less costly and effective alternatives. More specifically, when transactions costs are 
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high, as they are in China (Buckley et al., 2007), Chinese firms investing in the havens may 
follow diminution or escape strategies to reduce exposure to domestic institutional conditions 
(Witt and Lewin, 2007). The BVI, in contrast to the Cayman Islands, specializes in 
international business company (IBC) registrations and far outstrips all other havens in this 
regard (HOC, n.d.). In 2002, for example, it had around 400,000 IBCs compared, for 
example, to only 60,000 in the Cayman Islands or 24,000 in Cyprus and 30,000 in 
Netherlands Antilles (Hampton, 2002). Qualitative research on Chinese investors using the 
BVI shows they have particular regard for the BVI’s legal system (Maurer and Martin, 2011). 
This may explain why the overwhelming majority of property rights transactions in our 
sample firms are undertaken in the BVI.  
 
Xinhua Sports & Entertainment Limited (XSEL) provides an interesting example of how 
Chinese businesses use THOFCs for property rights transactions. It is a sports and media 
entertainment group that conducts all of its operations in mainland China. It has grown 
significantly since its inception, primarily through the acquisition of assets and businesses 
and development of its distribution channels (Xinhua, 2008). XSEL undertook a different 
sequence to most of the sample firms, by directly incorporating in the Cayman Islands. It 
completed its IPO on the NASDAQ in 2007, receiving net proceeds of US$200.3mn (Xinhua, 
2008). XSEL has also raised capital via placements of convertible preferred shares 
(US$60mn in 2006 and US$29.2mn in 2008) and convertible bonds in 2008 (US$30.7mn) 
(Xinhua, 2009). Its access to bank borrowing has dramatically increased since its IPO, from 
US$5.6mn in 2006 to US$48.7mn in 2007 and to US$40.3nm in 2008.  
 
***** FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ***** 
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After XSEL secured access to international capital markets it has undertaken numerous 
acquisitions. The proceeds from the IPO were used, for example, to fully acquire at least 
seven privately held offshore holding companies that own (or control) other onshore Chinese 
media businesses (italics in Figure 2). It has established one new offshore company in the 
Cayman Islands (Xinhua Media Entertainment Ltd). Of these eight new businesses six were 
incorporated in the BVI, one in the Cayman Islands and one in Hong Kong. Seven of these 
companies in turn effectively control at least 29 mainland Chinese subsidiaries (compared to 
the sample average of 6.3) and a further eight offshore holding companies (sample average is 
3.7). Through its 2007 acquisition of East Alliance Limited, a BVI holding company, XSEL 
now controls all of East Alliance’s wholly owned subsidiaries and variable interest entities 
collectively known as M-Group, a mainland China based mobile service provider. These are 
controlled via contractual agreements which include a secured loan agreement, exclusive 
equity purchase option agreement, an equity pledge agreement and a subrogation agreement 
entered into with Wuxianshijie (Figure 2). Through these acquisitions XSEL has 17 offshore 
holding companies in total (sample average is 3.3). As a result of these acquisitions XSEL 
has been able to expand aggressively into a range of different areas of media, as well as 
greatly expanding its geographical coverage of the Chinese market.  
 
The flexible and integrated use of a triad of holding companies in the Cayman Islands, BVI 
and Hong Kong, involving exploitation of their individual strengths as well as their 
complementarities, moreover, is very popular among Chinese MNEs (see Figures 1, 2, and 
3). The use of these regions is facilitated by their very close financial and legal integration 
(Vlcek, 2013). All have been or still are overseas British territories. Their integration was 
also greatly promoted by Hong Kong’s return to China in 1997. According to the IMF, the 
BVI sent a delegation to Hong Kong in 1989 to ‘promote the use of IBCs to hold assets in 
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anticipation of the 1997 return of the colony to Chinese sovereignty’ (IMF, 2004, 16). This 
promotional visit was followed ‘by a significant increase in the registration of IBCs by Hong 
Kong residents, and it is estimated that a significant number of IBCs continue to be formed 
by residents of Hong Kong’ (IMF, 2004, 16). Indeed, the bi-directional flows of capital 
registered between the BVI and Hong Kong are unusually large and it is ‘common practice 
for Hong Kong companies to set up non-operating companies in offshore financial centres’ 
(Census and Statistics Department, 2004, FC3). In 2007 the BVI was the largest recipient of 
OFDI flows from Hong Kong, receiving 47.8%. It was also the second largest inward 
investor to Hong Kong (after mainland China), responsible for 36.6% of all inward 
investment (Census and Statistics Department, 2007). These large flows between Hong Kong 
and the BVI, moreover, were due to ‘the popularity for Hong Kong enterprises in setting up 
non-operating companies to channel funds back to Hong Kong or to other places’ (Census 
and Statistics Department, 2007, 6). Hong Kong, moreover, has historically been by far the 
largest holder of OFDI stock in the BVI – making it the BVI’s largest inward and outward 
investor (UNCTAD, 2004). It is thus perhaps unsurprising that the BVI appears to be the 
preferred location for business registrations and property rights transactions and also explains 
its popularity with Chinese investors.  
 
4.3. Responsiveness to domestic institutional change: China’s taxation policy  
An important explanation for the use of THOFCs has been the preferential tax rates afforded 
to foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) in China which leads to ‘round-tripping’, a form of tax-
induced regulatory arbitrage that involves moving capital offshore only to bring back onshore 
again in the guise of foreign direct investment, so as to benefit from preferential tax treatment 
(e.g. Huang, 2003; Fung et al., 2010; Vlcek, 2013). A variety of measures, however, have 
also been introduced to restrict the registration of offshore holding companies by Chinese 
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firms and discourage round-tripping. Since 2006, new regulations mandate that all Chinese 
nationals wishing to invest overseas must register with their local State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange (SAFE). More importantly, since January 2008 the new Enterprise Income 
Tax Law has harmonised tax rates for FIEs and Chinese businesses. This provides that 
enterprises established under the laws of foreign countries or regions but whose ‘de facto 
management body’ is located in the PRC be treated as a resident enterprise for PRC taxation 
purposes. This means offshore holding companies may now be subject to the PRC income tax 
at the rate of 25% for their global income. Such measures are, potentially, highly punitive to 
offshore holding companies. Indeed, under the law, dividends, interests, rent or royalties 
payable by a FIE to its foreign non-resident enterprise investors (and proceeds from the 
disposition of assets by a foreign enterprise investor) are also subject to an additional 10% 
withholding tax. As such the tax benefits of setting up offshore holding companies have been 
eliminated and replaced with disincentives. Looking at the most recent listings on US stock-
markets, however, we find 40 of our sample firms filed their first 20-F form in 2008 or later 
(Table 2). 33 of these incorporated their listing vehicle in the Cayman Islands (and 7 in the 
BVI). The sample firms have increasingly incorporated a Hong Kong holding company to 
directly hold their mainland businesses. Between January 2005 and December 2009, 46 of 
our 72 sample firms had established a Hong Kong subsidiary, which, according to their 
annual reports, were established with a view to reducing their potential tax burdens. Every 
single one of the 330 20-F submissions made since the end of 2006 has specifically 
commented on the implications of new withholding taxes in China paid to offshore holding 
companies, including the preferential tax arrangements found in Hong Kong (that is a 5% 
instead of 10% rate). This demonstrates that offshore holding companies incorporated in 
THOFCs continued to be used even after the new enterprise income tax law, punitive to such 
offshore holding companies, took effect. 
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Actions Semiconductor provides us with a typical example (Figure 3). It is a leading 
semiconductor manufacturer specialising in the design and sale of portable media players. It 
was incorporated in the Cayman Islands in 2005 specifically to take advantage of, among 
other things, access to international capital markets: “[B]y incorporating our company in the 
Cayman Islands, we believe that we may have additional flexibility to pursue future business 
opportunities or financing alternatives” (Actions, 2010, 23). It completed its IPO on the 
NASDAQ in 2005, receiving net proceeds of US$43.6mn. Since its IPO, it has entered into a 
series of strategic investments, including equity acquisitions in other international companies 
incorporated in the BVI. Actions Semiconductor has also been active in the reorganisation of 
its offshore organisational structure, establishing holding companies as “tax effective 
investment vehicles” to counter the new withholding taxes (Actions, 2010, 23). Shortly 
before the income tax law change was introduced Actions began to reconfigure the 
organisational structure of its offshore holding company and international and mainland 
China subsidiaries explicitly for tax purposes: 
 
We determined that it is advantageous for us to adjust our investment structure to use 
Hong Kong companies to hold our interests in our PRC [People’s Republic of China] 
subsidiaries. On August 17, 2007 and September 6, 2007, we established two 
subsidiaries in Hong Kong …. which serve as the holding companies of our PRC 
subsidiaries. We wound up two BVI holding companies (Actions, 2010, 23). 
 
Actions Semiconductor has changed its holding company structure so as to pre-empt the 
introduction of the new withholding taxes. 
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***** FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE ***** 
 
A common theme found in sections 3 and 10 of the 20-F form (sections ‘Risks’ and ‘PRC 
taxation’, respectively) is the pending review of the tax status of our sample firms, 
particularly regarding the introduction of withholding taxes paid on dividends from mainland 
Chinese firms to offshore holding companies. Many of the sample firms clearly state that all 
necessary measures will be taken to mitigate the adverse impacts of any possible rescinding 
of preferential taxation rates currently applied, and cite the use of Hong Kong holding 
companies as a possible solution. In effect, disincentives to incorporate offshore (and round-
trip) have been put in place. In this light, it is of interest that many of our sample firms still 
look to use offshore vehicles. In total 40 of our sample firms filed their first 20-F form in 
2008 or later (Table 2), after the introduction of these withholding taxes. If these businesses 
were able to use alternative tax avoidance strategies to overcome the introduction of the new 
withholding taxes (such as transfer pricing strategies), it is not clear why they would go to the 
expense of incorporating these Hong Kong based holding companies. This suggests that 
lower tax rates alone are unlikely to be the sole explanation for the extensive use of the 
specific THOFCs we have identified. 
 
The internalization theory of the MNE is based on the principle that firm boundaries are set at 
the margin where the benefits of further internalization just offset the costs (Buckley and 
Casson, 1976). Our findings suggest that while the costs of going offshore have increased, the 
benefits, in terms of mitigating the high costs of domestic market imperfections, still 
outweigh these additional costs. If round-tripping for lower taxes was the primary 
explanation for the use of THOFCs, we might expect to see a reduction in their use, but this is 
not the case (Table 1). To date most attention on Chinese MNE’s OFDI to THOFCs has been 
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placed on how such investments are driven by tax-induced regulatory arbitrage (e.g. Fung et 
al., 2010; Dharmapala and Hines, 2009). Following from this, the consequences this may 
have for biasing FDI as a measure of MNE affiliate activity have also been raised. This line 
of thinking, focussing on the value-added generated in havens, assumes that tax haven related 
FDI generates no other productive activity (Beugelsdijk et al., 2010). Chinese businesses, 
however, also appear to use offshore companies to mitigate the high transactions costs of 
specific domestic market imperfections and institutional constraints. A degree of caution, 
therefore, is required when thinking about what type of productive or unproductive activities 
may take place in tax havens. While it is true, in the sense of physical production of goods or 
services, that no productive activities may take place in THOFCs, this is not to say that such 
multinational activity does not serve other important functions.  
 
Interestingly, macroeconomic modelling looking at the impact of tax havens also shows they 
create significant capital market competition (Rose and Spiegel, 2007). So while Beugelsdijk 
et al. (2010) are right to draw our attention to the large volumes of FDI channelled through 
THOFCs, care is required in thinking about the exact ways in which they are used. Our 
sample of firms, for example, shows that tax havens provide important financial services that 
are not supplied domestically. While many countries aspire to become to tax havens, 
moreover, it is only those with the best governance and institutions that actually succeed 
(Dharmapala and Hines, 2009). Low taxes, therefore, are only one, albeit important 
attraction, of THOFCs. Comparatively superior capital markets and more efficient institutions 
for property rights are also driving Chinese OFDI to THOFCs, facilitated by multinational 
ABS providers (Wójcik, 2013). 
 
5. Conclusion 
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The growth of outward FDI from emerging markets has become an important force shaping 
international economic geography. To date, however, the relatively high concentrations of 
national OFDI shares from the largest emerging markets to specific THOFCs have been 
somewhat overlooked. While financial geographers have consistently drawn attention to the 
importance of THOFCs (e.g., Roberts, 1995; Hudson, 2000), far fewer have looked at firm-
level motivations for FDI to these jurisdictions, despite the very large volumes of global FDI 
flowing to them. This gap exists, in part, because the way in which firm-level financing 
decisions affects corporate economic geographies has been somewhat overlooked (Martin, 
1999; Wrigley, 1999; Pollard, 2003). Motivated by the calls of financial geographers for 
greater research on how financing affects corporate, firm-level economic geographies, we 
used internalization theory as a complementary approach to further investigate the use of 
offshore incorporation in THOFCs (McCann, 2011). Based upon transaction costs and the 
theory of the firm, internalization theory provides an explicitly firm-level perspective relevant 
to MNEs. As such, it can provide insights into FDI location decisions in THOFCs. And 
although it is sometimes criticised as too closely following the precepts of neoclassical 
economics (Buckley and Casson, 1976), as it does not explicitly address the role of territory 
in the case of financial flows and systems, or the spatially embedded nature of MNEs (Martin 
1999; Yeung, 2009; Seo, 2011), here we have taken these criticisms seriously. We have done 
so by casting ‘location advantages’ in terms of the institutional, legal institutional and social 
relationship setting of the source country (China), the proximate host countries (BVI and 
Cayman Islands) and the target countries, which include China (for “round-tripping”) or the 
US (for capital augmentation) as well as the eventual destination of the capital. In doing so, 
despite the relatively conventional theoretical stance employed, we have extended 
internalization theory and also contributed to areas of current interest in financial geography. 
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We argue that locality and its specificities do matter, are location bound, and also difficult to 
transfer. As such we take the MNE as an embedded network of relationships, focussing on 
financial relationships in particular. The spatial configurations of MNEs, moreover, are seen 
as the cause and agency of economic activity. The taxation and legal intuitions of all the 
relevant locations are perceived of as parts of integrated global value chains, centred on 
individual (Chinese in our case) MNEs but also embedded in all the countries in which they 
have activities. Using this approach our findings show Chinese MNEs invest in THOFCs 
vertically in order to access certain markets and institutions that are not available to them 
domestically. As well as this, they also address capital market imperfections in and through 
particular THOFCs, taking advantage of the respective specialisations of these spaces, as well 
as the networks that these jurisdictions are embedded within. Even despite increased 
regulation and higher costs associated with offshore incorporation, this has meant Chinese 
MNEs continue to undertake FDI to THOFCs to address the significant domestic market 
imperfections they face (cf. McCann, 2011). The case of Chinese MNEs investing in 
THOFCs therefore provides an interesting, albeit novel example, of how corporate financing 
and institutional misalignments drive FDI location decisions and corporate economic 
geography. The integration of spatial aspects into internationalisation theory allows us to 
extend the conventional scope of internalisation theory and to provide pointers to future 
theoretical and empirical advances. 
 
In light of the global financial crisis, there have been increasing calls by financial 
geographers for the impact of ‘financialisation’ to be better incorporated and given more 
prominence within economic geography (Pike and Pollard, 2010; Pryke, 2011). Among 
financial geographers, moreover, it has also been noted that in spite of the great importance 
of THOFCs, including their links to world cities, advanced business services and general 
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financial system growth and development, there has been comparatively little research on 
them (Wójcik, 2013). Wójcik (2013, 338), for example, notes the irony of how in the lead up 
to the global financial crisis, ‘offshore finance seems to have been treated as a mere footnote 
to financial geography’. The same charge can be even more strongly levelled at IB scholars, 
who have, with one or two exceptions (Beugelsdijk et al. 2010; Sutherland and Ning, 2011), 
almost entirely elided this topic from the remit of their analysis, despite the huge volumes of 
FDI flows and stocks held offshore. Financial geographers have called for more research 
(Wainwright, 2011), including for the type of firm-level study undertaken here, which also 
incorporates consideration of emerging market MNEs (Wójcik, 2013). These are now 
strongly shaping international economic geography and, increasingly, the offshore world 
(Maurer and Martin, 2011; Vlcek, 2013; Wójcik, 2013). By cross-fertilizing ideas found in 
financial geography and mainstream IB and then applying them to how Chinese MNEs use 
THOFCs, we have made a start in addressing some of these prominent and important gaps 
highlighted by economic geographers (Wainwright, 2011; Wójcik, 2013). 
 
In doing so we have provided some directions for a future research agenda for IB and 
economic geography scholars alike, pointing towards new directions in thinking about 
offshore incorporation and in turn the economic geography of the MNE. IB scholars can still 
do much more to learn from economic geographers and incorporate greater analysis of 
THOFCs in the study of the MNE. To repeat the words of Pollard (2003, 446), and an idea 
echoed by a number of other economic geographers (Dicken, 2011; Sarre, 2007), ‘finance is a 
fundamental part of economic co-ordination that is not logically prior to or separate from 
production’. IB scholars can learn from these calls and do more to consider the relevance of 
their theories of the MNE to the case of FDI activity to THOFCs. By the same token, 
economic geographers can learn from the firm-level approaches often employed in IB, thus 
35 
 
moving beyond study of ‘financial architectures’ and more towards how firm-level financing 
decisions influence corporate economic geographies (Wrigley, 1999). The approach we have 
employed here, moreover, with its detailed focus on firm-level data on offshore subsidiaries, 
provides a potentially useful method for further studies. In the first instance these could, for 
example, develop our opening paragraph further and look at other emerging market MNEs, 
such as those from Brazil, Russia and India, to see if our arguments regarding offshore 
incorporation are also useful in these cases. 
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Figure 1: Suntech Power Holding Co.’s Organisational Structure, 2010 
 
 Source: Suntech (2010: 47) 
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Figure 2: Xinhua Sports and Entertainment Ltd.’s Organisational Structure, 2010 
 
Source: Xinhua Sports and Entertainment (2010: 56)
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Figure 3: Actions Semiconductor Co.’s Organisational Structure, 2010 
 
 
Source: Actions Semiconductor (2010: 36)
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Table 1: FDI flows between China and the Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands, Hong Kong and other THOFCs, 2003-2011 (US$ bn 
and %) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Stock, 2011 
From China to: bn % bn % bn % bn % bn % bn % bn % bn % bn % bn % 
Cayman Islands 0.8 28.3 1.3 23.4 5.2 42.1 7.8 44.4 2.6 9.8 1.5 2.7 5.4 9.5 3.5 5.1 4.9 6.6 21.7 5.1 
BVI 0.2 7.3 0.4 7.0 1.2 10.0 0.5 3.1 1.9 7.1 2.1 3.8 1.6 2.9 6.1 8.9 6.2 8.3 29.3 6.9 
Hong Kong 1.1 40.2 2.6 47.8 3.4 27.9 6.9 39.3 13.7 51.8 38.6 69.1 35.6 63.0 38.5 55.9 35.7 47.8 261.5 61.6 
Other THOFCs 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.6 2.8 4.0 7.0 5.0 7.3 6.6 8.9 22.6 5.3 
Total THOFCs 2.1 75.8 4.4 78.2 9.9 80.0 15.4 86.8 19.3 68.7 43.8 75.6 46.5 82.3 53.1 77.1 53.4 71.5 335.1 78.9 
Total OFDI 2.9  5.5  12.3  17.6  26.5  55.9  56.5  68.9  74.7  424.8  
                    
To China from:                    
Cayman Islands 0.9 1.6 2.0 3.4 1.9 3.2 2.1 3.3 2.6 3.4 3.1 3.4 2.5 2.9 2.5 2.4 2.2 1.9 n/a n/a 
BVI 5.8 10.8 6.7 11.1 9.0 15.0 11.2 17.8 16.6 22.1 16.0 17.3 11.3 12.5 10.5 9.9 9.7 8.4 n/a n/a 
Hong Kong 17.7 33.1 19.0 31.3 17.9 29.8 20.2 32.1 27.7 37.1 41.0 44.4 46.1 51 60.6 57.3 70.5 60.8 n/a n/a 
Other THOFCs 5.4 9.8 6.1 8.9 6 10.5 7.1 11.2 9.2 12.4 12.3 13.4 9.1 10.1 7.9 7.5 10.7 9.2 n/a n/a 
Total THOFCs 29.8 55.7 33.8 55.7 34.8 57.7 40.6 64.4 56.1 75.0 72.4 78.0 69.0 76.0 68.5 64.7 93.2 80.3 n/a n/a 
Total FDI 53.5  60.6  60.3  63.0  74.8  92.4  90.0  105.7  116.0  n/a n/a 
Source: MOFCOM, NBS, & SAFE (2008, 2012); National Bureau of Statistics (various years). 
Note: ‘Other tax haven and OFCs’ comprises 44 countries based on Zorome (2007). The China Statistical Yearbook 2012 does not publish 
inward FDI stock data. 
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Table 2: Our sample of 20-F forms 
Year Total number of sample 
firms  
Number of sample 
firms submitting first 
20-F forms 
Total number of 
sample 20-F 
submissions 
1999 1 1 1 
2000 0 0 2 
2001 0 0 3 
2002 3 2 6 
2003 3 0 9 
2004 4 1 13 
2005 11 7 24 
2006 22 11 46 
2007 32 10 78 
2008 59 27 137 
2009 66 7 203 
2010 72 6 275 
Source: Securities and Exchange Commission (2010).  
 
 
